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Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage
Daniel O. Conkle*
During oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 Justice Scalia pressed
advocate Theodore Olson with a provocative question: “I’m curious, . . . when did
it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791?
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted? . . . [S]ome time after Baker
[v. Nelson,2 decided in 1972], where we said it didn’t even raise a substantial
Federal question? When—when—when did the law become this?”3 In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hollingsworth and in United States v. Windsor,4
of course, the premise of Scalia’s question does not yet hold. The Court evaded the
Fourteenth Amendment issue in Hollingsworth,5 and it explicitly confined its
decision in Windsor to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).6 Baker v.
Nelson may still be controlling. In any event, the Supreme Court has not recognized
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Not yet. But such a ruling seems
increasingly inevitable. And if and when the Court rules in that manner, Scalia’s
question will return to center stage.7
There are various possible groundings for a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage. Creative minds might contend that the Fourteenth Amendment, properly
understood, has always protected such a right. If so, then the answer to Scalia’s
question is 1868, when the Amendment was ratified. It simply took us a while—a
century and a half!—to understand the Amendment’s implications. Indeed,
Professor Jack M. Balkin, among others, might be inclined to accept this sort of
“originalist” argument.8 But it requires an account of original meaning that is so

† Copyright © 2014 Daniel O. Conkle.
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Scholar, and Adjunct
Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University Bloomington. Thanks to the Indiana Law
Journal for organizing this symposium and to my colleagues Dawn Johnsen, Steve Sanders,
Ryan Scott, Deborah Widiss, and Elisabeth Zoller for their comments and suggestions.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2. 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.).
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144) (quoting Justice Scalia).
4. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
5. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit lacked
jurisdiction and that its judgment invalidating California’s ban on same-sex marriage should
be vacated. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. Neither the majority nor the dissenters
reached the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment issue.
6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
7. In fact, a variant of Scalia’s question, more broadly framed, has been debated for
decades. See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean
What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).
8. See Francis Wilkinson, Originalism, Scalia and Gay Marriage: An Interview with
Jack Balkin, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-03-26/originalism-scalia-and-gay-marriage-an-interview-with-jack-balkin.html;
cf.
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007)
(contending that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can be understood to
include the right to abortion). Balkin elaborates his theory in JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
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abstract—or, as Balkin would have it, so “thin”9—as to give originalism little or no
constraining force, at least in the context of Fourteenth Amendment claims. In
reality, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has changed over time, and it
will continue to do so.10 In my judgment, moreover, this is precisely as it should
be.11
When the Supreme Court interprets the capacious language of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses,12 its task is art as much as science, judicial
statesmanship as much as technical craft. The Court mediates past, present, and
future, identifying individual rights that befit the evolving political morality of our
society. By its very nature, the Fourteenth Amendment protects minority rights
from state and local majoritarian oppression. But what rights, in particular, does the
Amendment protect? In deciding this question, the Justices rely in part on
precedent and in part on their own understandings of liberty and equality. At the
same time, however, the Court generally acts, and properly so, in a manner that
tracks the evolving values of the country as a whole. In so doing, the Court
confronts contentious political-moral issues with a measure of judicial humility,
and it deflects the charge that its actions are unduly countermajoritarian.
When asked to recognize a new constitutional right, the Court should act neither
too soon nor too late. The Court errs if it trumps the political process and
federalism prematurely, as it seemingly did in Roe v. Wade.13 Yet at some point a
claim of right, if persuasive to the Court as a matter of justice, should no longer be
denied as a matter of prudence. At some point the country will be ready, or at least
ready enough, for the Court to recognize a national constitutional right. As
Professor Alexander M. Bickel observed, “the Court should declare as law only
ORIGINALISM (2011).
9. See Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM
REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 70–80 (2013).
10. Under Balkin’s sophisticated account, originalism itself can incorporate this
change, with originalism and living constitutionalism being seen as “two sides of the same
coin.” Id. at 80.
11. In her thoughtful and thought-provoking contribution to this symposium, my
colleague Dawn Johnsen likewise addresses the issue of constitutional change, offering
observations that are in some respects complementary to my own. See Dawn Johnsen,
Windsor, Shelby County, and the Demise of Originalism: A Personal Account,
89 IND. L.J. 3 (2014).
12. “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Ginsburg, for example, has contended that Roe
“short-circuited the development of a political groundswell that was building at the state and
local level—not only on the issue of abortion—but on all phases of women’s rights.” Allen
Pusey, Ginsburg: Court Should Have Avoided Broad-Based Decision in Roe v. Wade, ABA
JOURNAL (May 13, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ginsburg
_expands_on_her_disenchantment_with_roe_v._wade_legacy/; see also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 379–82, 385 (1985) (arguing that the Court should have confined itself to a
narrow decision in Roe and describing the Court’s broad ruling as “[h]eavy-handed judicial
intervention”). For a competing perspective, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before
(and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).
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such principles as will—in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future—gain
general assent.”14 And whenever the Court acts, it should proceed with a measure
of humility and caution, recognizing legitimate competing interests and minimizing
its intrusion on our system of democratic self-government.
Just as American societal values have changed over time, so too have the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court has
already expanded the Amendment far beyond what its framers and ratifiers had in
mind.15 Should the Court expand the Amendment even further, to embrace a right
to same-sex marriage? Society’s perspective on this issue is in a state of flux. In a
notable development in 2012, President Barack Obama, citing a new understanding
of his Christian faith, announced that he no longer opposes same-sex marriage but
instead supports it.16 And President Obama is not alone; the views of many
Americans recently have “evolved” in the same direction.17 Indeed, as I will
discuss, there has been a remarkably rapid, and seemingly inexorable, shift of
opinion from opposition to approval. So, is it time for the Court to declare a
national constitutional right? Or should the Court await further, more definitive
evidence of a societal consensus that is likely to be enduring? And under what form
of reasoning might a Fourteenth Amendment right be justified, either now or in the
future?
These questions have no easy answers. Even so, I hope to shed some light on
them, especially the last one. Accordingly, I will briefly explore and evaluate three
possible lines of Supreme Court reasoning, each of which might support a
Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage: first, substantive due process;
second, heightened scrutiny equal protection; and third, rational basis equal
protection coupled with a finding of illicit “animus.” As we will see, each form of
constitutional justification can find support in evolving national values. In my
judgment, however, the first two alternatives, with primary emphasis on the second,
present the best and strongest arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. By
contrast, I think it would be misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Court to rely
on the third line of reasoning.

14. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
BAR OF POLITICS 239 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). With the benefit of hindsight, it
seems clear that Roe v. Wade did not satisfy this condition, because the Court’s 1973
decision did not garner “general assent” in “a rather immediate foreseeable future.” Indeed,
it has yet to do so even now, some forty years later. Whether and how the Court’s decision
itself contributed to the ongoing controversy is a separate question. See supra note 13.
15. In the context of women’s rights, for instance, the Court has discarded Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine dating back to the 1870s—and presumably reflecting the framers’ and
ratifiers’ sentiments—as “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the
individual, or the Constitution.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897
(1992).
16. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand
on Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1.
17. Prior to his announcement, President Obama had stated that his views on the issue
were “evolving.” Id.
THE
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I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The substantive due process argument for same-sex marriage builds upon a line
of cases beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut.18 In these cases, relying mainly on the Due Process Clause, the Court
has recognized a number of unenumerated constitutional rights, including the right
to conventional marriage19 and the right of adults, including homosexuals, to
engage in consensual sexual conduct.20 At times the Court has asserted that
substantive due process rights are confined to rights that “are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”21—that is, rights that have broad and
longstanding historical support, as revealed in specific legal policies and social
practices.22 This backward-looking theory of historical tradition might well support
the protection of conventional marriage,23 but it plainly would not support a right to
same-sex marriage.24 Hardly a deeply rooted American tradition, same-sex

18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In fact, this line of cases, more broadly understood, can be
seen to include earlier decisions as well. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
19. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (declaring that “the right to marry is
part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause”).
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); cf. id. (quoting the more
abstract “ordered liberty” formulation of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937), but using this language in a restrictive manner, noting that substantive due process
rights must be deeply rooted historically “and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed’” (emphasis added)).
22. See id. at 710–28.
23. But cf. Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1401–07 (2010) (suggesting that substantive due process might not
protect a right to civil marriage, not even conventional marriage, in the sense that the
government, in theory, could abolish civil marriage altogether).
24. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714–15 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting). One might resist this conclusion by contending that the tradition of marriage
should be conceptualized more broadly, at a level of generality sufficient to encompass
marriage between consenting adults, without regard to the conventional opposite-sex
limitation. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991–93 (2010), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Tebbe & Widiss, supra note
23, at 1391–95 (advancing this argument, but conceding that it has had very limited success
in the courts); see generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990) (noting that “historical
traditions, like rights themselves, exist at various levels of generality”). As I have explained
elsewhere, however, this move toward abstraction—defining traditions at levels of generality
that historical actors plainly would have rejected—deprives the theory of historical tradition
of its ability to provide an objective standard of judicial decision making. See Daniel O.
Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 92–94 (2006). At
the same time, it undermines the theory’s normative justification, a justification that depends
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marriage was not recognized by any state until 2003 (nor by any country until
2000).25
Conversely, at other times the Court has suggested a more progressive, forwardlooking theory of substantive due process, a theory of evolving national values.
Under this decision-making model, the Court can recognize an unenumerated right
despite the absence of historical support, as long as the right has broad support in
the contemporary United States. Under this approach, constitutional rights can
emerge over time, reflecting ongoing legal developments, especially at the statelaw level, which may suggest a salutary maturation of societal thinking.26 This type
of progressive methodology played a prominent role in the Court’s 2003 decision
in Lawrence v. Texas,27 which protected the right of homosexual adults to engage
in consensual sexual conduct. It likewise might support a right to same-sex
marriage, although—in the absence of additional state-law changes in this setting—
the argument would go considerably beyond the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence.28
In Lawrence, the Court advanced various justifications for its decision,
including the Justices’ own determination that criminal prohibitions on homosexual
conduct violate “liberty of the person,” which “presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”29
The Justices did not dismiss the opposing view as bigotry or intolerance, observing
that it may reflect “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles.”30 Even so, they concluded that the claim of liberty was paramount and
must prevail.31 Notably, however, the Justices emphasized that their own
understanding of liberty was supported by a contemporary national consensus.
Thus, the Court put aside the long history of sodomy prohibitions, both in America
in part on considerations of democratic self-government, in part on Burkean philosophy, and
in part on society’s interests in legal stability and in protecting settled expectations
concerning individual freedom. See id. at 90–92, 94–96; Michael W. McConnell, The Right
to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 682–85, 683 n.96. The
move toward abstraction here, to my mind, is similar to the move toward abstraction in
expansive understandings of originalism, and I find neither of these efforts particularly
helpful in determining the scope of contemporary constitutional rights.
25. Massachusetts was the first state and Netherlands the first country. See Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
26. In still other cases, especially in the context of abortion, the Court has gone even
further, embracing a theory of reasoned judgment. Under this theory, the Court, through a
process of political-moral reasoning, is free to recognize rights even if the rights lack
widespread historical or contemporary support. The Court’s various decisions thus reflect
three competing theories of substantive due process: historical tradition, evolving national
values, and reasoned judgment. In an earlier article, using criteria that draw upon
considerations of majoritarian self-government, judicial objectivity, and functional utility, I
have explored and evaluated these three theories, arguing that although each has strengths
and weaknesses, the best approach, on balance, is that of evolving national values. See
Conkle, supra note 24.
27. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
28. The following analysis of Lawrence draws upon Conkle, supra note 24, at 121–23.
29. 539 U.S. at 562.
30. Id. at 571.
31. See id. at 574. To this extent, the Court’s decision relied on a methodology of
reasoned judgment. For elaboration, see Conkle, supra note 24, at 119–21.
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and in western civilization generally, concluding instead that “our laws and
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”32 These legal and
societal changes, the Court argued, revealed “an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”33
More specifically, the Court cited the Model Penal Code of 1955, which
recommended the repeal of laws forbidding consensual sodomy, and the eventual
legislative adoption of this approach by a substantial majority of the states.34 These
legislative developments, coupled with five state court invalidations under state
constitutional law,35 left only thirteen states with sodomy prohibitions at the time of
Lawrence.36 Even in these thirteen states, moreover, consensual sodomy was rarely
prosecuted, suggesting that legal and social disapproval was waning.37 The Court’s
decision in Lawrence, therefore, was supported by powerful evidence of a national
consensus, a legal and societal consensus that had developed and endured over the
course of several decades.
Is there a similar trend favoring the recognition of same-sex marriage? Yes, but
this trend, to date, is far less compelling. Indeed, except in the last few years, state
law making has been moving decidedly in the opposite direction, with some thirty
states recently amending their state constitutions to expressly prohibit same-sex
marriage.38 In the last five years, however, it seems that the tide has turned. Not
counting California, which is implementing same-sex marriage under a federal
court mandate,39 fifteen states and the District of Columbia have acted to recognize
same-sex marriage.40 Several of these jurisdictions have acted as the result of state
court rulings under state constitutional law; the remainder have acted legislatively
or by popular referendum.41 Notably, the largest part of this trend is extremely
recent: Except for Massachusetts, all of the same-sex marriage jurisdictions have
acted since 2008, with most of them acting only in 2012 or 2013.42 And even now,

32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72.
33. Id. at 572.
34. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
35. See id. at 576.
36. Id. at 573. Looking beyond our nation’s borders, the Court also cited comparable
legislative and judicial action in Europe. Id. at 572–73, 576.
37. See id. at 573.
38. One state, North Carolina, adopted this sort of constitutional amendment as
recently as 2012. See Campbell Robertson, Ban on Gay Marriage Passes in North Carolina,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A15. All of the other states acted between 1998 and 2008. For a
chronological listing of these state constitutional amendments, see History of State
Constitutional Marriage Bans, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry
/state-constitutional-marriage-bans#_ftn1.
39. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), aff’d on other grounds
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
40. Defining Marriage: State Defense of Marriage Laws and Same-Sex Marriage,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx.
41. Id.
42. See id.; Same Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last
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only a third of the states have moved in this direction, creating roughly the mirror
image of Lawrence, in which only a fourth of the states had declined to act in a
favorable manner.
To be sure, there is other evidence of changing societal values. Surveys suggest
that a majority of Americans now support same-sex marriage,43 thus signaling a
remarkable turnaround in public opinion.44 Young people are especially supportive,
and, more generally, the trend lines are strongly positive.45 In the language of
Lawrence, there may be “an emerging awareness”46 favoring a right to same-sex
marriage. For the Court to rely on such reasoning here, however, would be a matter
of prediction, not the accomplished fact that was evident in Lawrence. The survey
evidence certainly suggests a persistent trend, but the trend is of very recent
vintage, and society has had little experience with same-sex marriage, a practice
that departs from centuries of tradition and that, over time, could have
unanticipated consequences.47 Although it seems unlikely, the shift of societal
opinion could slow in the face of experience, or opinion might even change
directions once again.
Under the theory of evolving national values, there is a plausible argument that
substantive due process supports a right to same-sex marriage. Yet this argument,
standing alone, seems inadequate to the task. The Justices’ own understanding of
liberty, grounded in arguments of political morality, might very well support such a
claim. Given the competing demands of federalism and the political process,
however, the Justices should be reluctant to act merely on their own political-moral
judgment. The shift in societal opinion is supportive, as is the recent pattern of state
law recognition, but it seems premature to conclude that there is a national
consensus on this issue, much less a consensus that is likely to be enduring. At least
for now, substantive due process seems insufficient to support a Fourteenth
Amendment right to same-sex marriage, even under a progressive theory of
evolving national values. That is, substantive due process, without more, seems
insufficient. But there is more.

updated Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex
-marriage-laws.aspx. For an interactive map of the United States, showing changes in state
law from 1995 to the present, see Same-Sex Marriage State-by-State, PEW RESEARCH
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (last updated Nov. 20, 2013), http://features.pewforum.org
/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/.
43. E.g., Susan Page, Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA
TODAY (July 1, 2013, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01
/poll-supreme-court-gay-marriage-affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/.
44. See Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/.
45. See id. Using sophisticated modeling, Nate Silver predicts that same-sex marriage
soon will command majority support throughout most of the United States. In particular, he
suggests that if the issue were placed on the ballot, it would be supported by voters in thirtytwo states by 2016 and by voters in forty-four states by 2020. Id.
46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
47. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“The long-term consequences of this change are not now known and are unlikely to be
ascertainable for some time to come.”).
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II. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY EQUAL PROTECTION
As an alternative or additional argument for extending marriage to same-sex
couples, the Supreme Court, not surprisingly, might turn to the Equal Protection
Clause. Beyond its obvious textual appeal, equal protection is an attractive
argument because the Court’s existing doctrine includes precedents that can readily
be extended to the same-sex marriage context. Thus, building upon its existing
doctrine, the Court could conclude, as did the Second Circuit in Windsor, that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is “quasi-suspect,” triggering heightened
scrutiny,48 and that laws precluding gays and lesbians from marrying cannot
survive this demanding review.
The central historical focus of the Equal Protection Clause was racial
discrimination.49 As Professor Archibald Cox observed, however, “Once loosed,
the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.”50 Thus, the Supreme Court has treated
racial discrimination as the paradigmatic “suspect classification,” triggering strict
judicial scrutiny and probable invalidation,51 but it has reasoned by analogy in
declaring that certain other classifications also are presumptively unconstitutional.
These extensions of the Equal Protection Clause reflect a reasoned extrapolation
from the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but they do not depend
on the original meaning in any specific sense. Instead, they rest mainly on the
Justices’, and society’s, changing understandings of what equality demands.
In deciding whether to treat a nonracial classification as “suspect” or “quasisuspect,” the Court has invoked various criteria, but, as I will explain, three have
been especially influential. First, is the classifying trait, like race, an immutable
personal characteristic—an accident of birth beyond a person’s control or
responsibility—rendering it presumptively unjust for the government to use the
trait as a basis for allocating rewards or penalties? Second, is the trait, like race,
broadly irrelevant to legitimate generalization, rendering discrimination on this
basis not only unfair but also indefensible in a wide range of governmental
settings? And third, is the disadvantaged group, like African Americans and other
racial minorities, a group that lacks political power and that therefore warrants
special judicial solicitude, that is, special protection from the ordinary operation of
the political process?
In addressing gender discrimination, for instance, the Supreme Court, acting
more than a century after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, moved from its

48. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
49. Indeed, as the Supreme Court declared shortly after their ratification, all three of
the post-Civil War Amendments were animated by “one pervading purpose”: “the freedom
of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873).
50. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966).
51. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (declaring that any racial
classification is “immediately suspect” and demands “strict scrutiny,” which renders the
classification invalid unless it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).
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traditional deferential stance52 to a vigorous form of heightened scrutiny (albeit
falling short of the full strict scrutiny that applies to race). In so doing, the Court
made gender discrimination “quasi-suspect,” for reasons best articulated in Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson.53 As Brennan explained,
gender is substantially similar to race under each of the three criteria that I have
outlined: first, it is an “immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth”;54 second, it “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society”;55 and third, women not only suffered historically from
political disadvantages56 but also (at least in 1973, when Frontiero was decided)
continued to “face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination,”
including “in the political arena.”57 Accordingly, as the Court later held, genderbased classifications require an “exceedingly persuasive justification”58 and violate
equal protection unless they “serve important governmental objectives and [are]
substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives.”59 Using similar
reasoning, the Court has also extended strict or heightened scrutiny to
classifications based on alienage and illegitimacy.60
The Supreme Court’s three-part analysis calls for judgments of fact and value,
judgments that directly address political-moral questions of justice and fairness as
well as the judiciary’s role in redressing failures in the political process. At the
same time, however, the Court’s extensions of the Equal Protection Clause—for
example, to protect women and illegitimate children from historically sanctioned
forms of discrimination—generally have tracked the changing values of society
itself. In Frontiero, for example, even as he cited the continuing political
disadvantages faced by women, Justice Brennan found support for heightened
scrutiny in the very fact that Congress itself, reflecting the shifting values of the
day, recently had “manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based
classifications.”61 More broadly, speaking in a later case, Justice Marshall candidly
observed that “constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of
liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time.”62 Moreover, he continued,
when “[s]hifting cultural, political, and social patterns” lead to changing patterns of

52. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
53. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
54. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 684–85.
57. Id. at 686.
58. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
60. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (illegitimacy); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (alienage).
61. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687 (plurality opinion). Brennan cited congressional
antidiscrimination legislation as well as the proposed (albeit unratified) Equal Rights
Amendment. Id. at 687–88.
62. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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legislation, “courts should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance
on evolving principles of equality.”63
Under the three-factor inquiry, the argument for extending heightened scrutiny
to sexual orientation is straightforward. First, it is increasingly clear that for the
vast majority of individuals, sexual orientation is immutable, not a matter of
choice.64 Thus, under the first criterion, sexual orientation is a good fit, albeit not
perfect. Second, as with gender, sexual orientation, in most legal settings, is an
invalid basis for generalization and therefore for governmental policy making.
Even if sexual orientation is relevant to certain issues, perhaps including marriage,
these issues are few and far between. As a result, the second criterion is readily
satisfied. And third, as the Second Circuit concluded in Windsor, the political
position of gays and lesbians today is analogous to that of women at the time of
Frontiero: Having endured a long history of prejudice and disadvantage, they have
made considerable progress, “but they still ‘face pervasive, although at times more
subtle, discrimination . . . in the political arena.’”65 As a result, it remains difficult
for homosexuals “to politically protect themselves from wrongful
discrimination,”66 suggesting that the judiciary should play an active role under the
Equal Protection Clause.
Simultaneously, also as in Frontiero, there is evidence of a shift in societal
values that may support an evolving principle of equality that demands heightened
scrutiny in this context. As with gender discrimination at the time of Frontiero,
Congress recently has shown at least some “increasing sensitivity”67 to sexual
orientation discrimination, acting in 2009 to extend special federal protection to
victims of violence based on sexual orientation68 and in 2010 to repeal the
discriminatory military policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”69 Many states
have gone further, adopting antidiscrimination laws and policies in a variety of
settings, including employment and housing.70 More generally, Americans are
increasingly tolerant of homosexuality, in part because they are coming to agree
that it is indeed an accident of birth.71 Thus, just as Theodore Olson argued in

63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Aaron T. Norton, Thomas J. Allen & Charles L.
Sims, Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics of Self-Identified Lesbian,
Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 176
(2010), cited in Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal.
2012), appeal dismissed, Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15192 (9th Cir.
July 23, 2013).
65. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
66. Id.
67. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687 (plurality opinion).
68. See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, §§ 4701–13, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835–44 (2009).
69. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat.
3515 (2010).
70. See Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org
/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies.
71. See Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans See Gay, Lesbian Orientation as Birth
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response to Justice Scalia’s vexing question of “when,” it may be that the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause changed “when we—as a culture determined that
sexual orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot control.”72 Even
if Americans remain divided on the particular question of same-sex marriage, their
more general shift of opinion—reflected to a significant degree in legal changes at
the federal and state levels—tends to support a new understanding of equal
protection, an understanding that in turn may bear on the issue of marriage.
Over time, changing societal attitudes about gays and lesbians may undermine
the argument that they are politically disadvantaged and therefore warrant special
judicial solicitude. For now, however, it appears that homosexuals continue to face
sufficient prejudice and disadvantage to satisfy the third part of the three-factor
analysis. At the same time, this lingering political handicap makes their political
successes, with respect to same-sex marriage and more generally, all the more
remarkable and all the more indicative of evolving societal values. As with gender
at the time of Frontiero, then, there is a strong argument that discrimination based
on sexual orientation, including prohibitions on same-sex marriage, should be
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, an active
judicial role may be especially appropriate in vindicating a right to same-sex
marriage because most of the prohibitions are embodied in state constitutional
amendments, thus removing them from the ordinary process of political change.73
If the gender formulation of heightened scrutiny is applied, same-sex marriage
prohibitions cannot survive in the absence of an “exceedingly persuasive
justification,”74 which requires the government to demonstrate that they “serve
important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to [the]
achievement of those objectives.”75 By every indication, no such justification
exists. As discussed below, it may very well be rational and reasonable to restrict
marriage to opposite-sex couples, but that is not enough to satisfy heightened
scrutiny. To be sure, there are governmental objectives that could qualify as
“important”—notably, encouraging responsible procreation and sound
childrearing—but these objectives are likely to falter under the “substantial
relationship” requirement, because there is little evidence that same-sex marriage
prohibitions substantially advance these objectives.76 Justifications along these
Factor, GALLUP POLITICS (May 16, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162569/americans
-gay-lesbian-orientation-birth-factor.aspx.
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(No. 12-144) (quoting Theodore B. Olson). “There’s no specific date in time,” Olson
continued. “This is an evolutionary cycle.” Id.
73. In previous cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated the imposition of special
political hurdles on the advancement of equality claims. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
74. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
75. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
76. The district court in Hollingsworth boldly concluded—in my view, mistakenly—
that arguments along these lines failed even rational basis review. In any event, the court’s
evaluation of the evidence clearly suggests that these justifications are inadequate under
heightened scrutiny. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 999–1000 (2010),
aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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lines, however reasonable, simply are not “exceedingly persuasive.” As a result,
heightened scrutiny equal protection strongly supports the invalidation of these
prohibitions and therefore a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage.77
III. RATIONAL BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION AND ILLICIT “ANIMUS”
As we have seen, there is a plausible argument that substantive due process
supports a right to same-sex marriage, and there is a far stronger argument that
equal protection supports such a right, on the ground that classifications based on
sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, calling for heightened scrutiny that marriage
prohibitions cannot survive. Each argument is informed by evolving societal
values, and the two arguments can work in tandem. Taken together, but with equal
protection doing most of the work, these arguments can readily justify a Fourteenth
Amendment right to same-sex marriage.
There is a third potential basis for a right to same-sex marriage, also grounded in
equal protection but not requiring a declaration that classifications based on sexual
orientation are quasi-suspect.78 Instead, the Supreme Court, extending its reasoning
in Windsor, could conclude that state law prohibitions on same-sex marriage are
invalid even under rational basis scrutiny because they reflect an unconstitutional
“animus” toward gays and lesbians, that is, “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.”79 A similar analysis has been used in other cases,80 including
Romer v. Evans,81 which also addressed discrimination based on sexual
orientation.82

77. If the Supreme Court were to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in this fashion,
it would be echoing the state law rulings of three state supreme courts, including the
California Supreme Court in the decision that led to Proposition 8 and later Hollingsworth.
Each of these courts, applying state constitutional law, concluded that classifications based
on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny—indeed, in the case of California, fullfledged strict scrutiny—and that same-sex marriage prohibitions cannot survive that review.
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
78. In fact, although I cannot address it in the limited space of this Essay, there is yet
another equal protection argument that might be advanced, an argument grounded in the
fundamental interests strand of equal protection doctrine. See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note
23, at 1412–49.
79. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
80. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47, 450
(1985); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35. As Professor Cass R. Sunstein has suggested, this
strand of equal protection doctrine provides “a kind of magical trump card” that can be “used
to invalidate badly motivated laws without refining a new kind of scrutiny.” Cass R.
Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1996).
81. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see id. at 632, 634–36.
82. In Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that had
nullified and precluded state and local laws and policies protecting gays and lesbians from
sexual orientation discrimination. See id. at 623–24.
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In the context of marriage, this line of reasoning might be supported in part by
evolving national values, on the view that society is coming to regard opposition to
same-sex marriage as not merely wrong but illegitimate—the product of antiquated
and untenable prejudice and bigotry. This perspective is not implausible. As
discussed earlier, there is a long history of bias against homosexuals, and this bias
surely has played a role in the continuing opposition to same-sex marriage. But
there are less pernicious grounds for supporting the conventional approach to
marriage, and, even as societal thinking about homosexuality has evolved, it is
hardly apparent that prejudice or bias is the exclusive or dominant motivation in
this particular setting. As a result, the notion that evolving values support the view
that marriage restrictions are animus-based is, at best, highly contentious. More
generally, in my view, the Court was wrong to rely on animus reasoning in
Windsor, and, in any event, it should not extend this reasoning to state laws that
affirm the traditional approach to marriage.
In Windsor, the Court nullified section 3 of DOMA, a 1996 statute declaring
that, regardless of state law, “marriage” under federal law was confined to
opposite-sex couples.83 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court invoked
various considerations, including federalism84 and hints of substantive due
process.85 The Court’s primary argument, however, was that Congress had acted
with illicit “animus,” thus violating equal protection.86 Because it declined to adopt
heightened scrutiny, the Court necessarily concluded—albeit without serious
discussion—that section 3 could not survive rational basis review, that is, that it did
not rationally serve any legitimate governmental interest.87 Otherwise, the Court
could not have concluded, as it did, that DOMA was animated by “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”88
In fact, however, as noted by the Windsor dissenters, section 3 did serve
interests that appear to be perfectly legitimate, and it did so in an entirely rational
manner. Most obviously, it preserved, within the federal domain, an approach to
marriage that had prevailed throughout history and that continues to reflect a
reasoned—albeit now contested—understanding of this important institution.89 It

83. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
84. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–93 (emphasizing that the states, not the federal
government, have the primary authority to define and regulate marriage).
85. See id. at 2695 (declaring that DOMA denies “the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” and is an unconstitutional “deprivation of the
liberty of the person”); see also id. at 2692 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567
(2003), a substantive due process case, for the proposition that homosexual intimacy “can
form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring’”).
86. See id. at 2693, 2695 (citing Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and noting
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes an equal protection component).
87. Cf. id. at 2696 (stating that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure” same-sex married couples).
88. Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
89. See id. at 2718–19 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE:
WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 258–59 (2009) (explaining that there are competing
conceptions of “the purpose, or telos, of marriage as a social institution,” with the traditional
view focusing on procreation and the argument for same-sex marriage emphasizing loving
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likewise advanced interests in legal stability and uniformity,90 and it avoided
difficult choice-of-law questions, questions that now will arise precisely because
this provision has been nullified.91 In reality, the Court could not invalidate section
3 under ordinary rational basis principles. Rather, it seems clear that the Court
applied a version of heightened scrutiny. But it did so sub silencio, and therefore
without a stated justification.
As I have explained, there is a strong argument that laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians, including section 3 of DOMA, should indeed be subject to
heightened scrutiny. But there is little to be said for judicial obfuscation. Justice
Marshall’s observation concerning an earlier “animus” ruling is equally fitting
here: “[I]t is important to articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles
that justify subjecting [a law] to the searching review—the heightened scrutiny—
that actually leads to its invalidation.”92 What is more, as Chief Justice Roberts
observed in Windsor, a finding of legislative “animus” is insulting and
disrespectful, “tar[ring] the political branches with the brush of bigotry.”93 Thus, in
Windsor, the Court accused Congress of acting (by overwhelming congressional
majorities, no less)94 merely—or at least primarily—purposefully to “injure,”95
“disapprov[e],”96 “stigma[tize],”97 “demean,”98 and “degrade”99 same-sex married
couples and to “humiliate[]” their children.100 This is an especially disturbing
charge when, as here, the judicial insult is gratuitous, because the Court could
readily have reached the same result in another, far more persuasive manner: by
candidly adopting heightened scrutiny and invalidating section 3 on that basis.
When the question turns from DOMA to state laws, moreover, there are
additional reasons for avoiding animus-based reasoning. In the first place, the statelaw context eliminates the federalism concern that was present in Windsor and that
the Court directly linked to its animus rationale. Declaring that “[d]iscriminations
commitment).
90. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2708 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice
of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012)); see also Deborah A.
Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 IND. L.J. 43 (2014) (arguing that the federal
government should address these complexities by extending uniform federal rights to samesex couples across the country).
92. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 456 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 459–60
(explaining that ill-defined and poorly justified precedents leave lower courts uninformed
and the Supreme Court unaccountable).
93. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 2693 (majority opinion).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2695.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2694. In an earlier decision protecting gay rights, also authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Court was more charitable. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)
(describing opposition to homosexual conduct as a product not of animus or bigotry but
rather of “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles”).
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of an unusual character” are more likely to reflect “an improper animus or
purpose,”101 the Court concluded that “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage . . . is strong
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval.”102 According to
the Court, then, there were two competing traditions in Windsor: the tradition of
opposite-sex marriage, recognized “throughout the history of civilization,”103 but
also the tradition of treating marriage questions “as being within the authority and
realm of the separate States.”104 State law prohibitions on same-sex marriage, by
contrast, simultaneously honor both traditions, making them immune from the
charge that they deviate from tradition and are therefore suggestive of illicit
animus.105 Nor, with rare exception, do these prohibitions take away preexisting
state law rights, a factor cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hollingsworth to support its
finding of improper animus in the adoption of California’s Proposition 8.106 More
generally, like President Obama before his recent change of heart, those who
oppose same-sex marriage may be wrong, but it would be equally wrong to “tar
[them] with the brush of bigotry.”107
In addition, the recognition of same-sex marriage as a Fourteenth Amendment
right will raise a host of religious liberty questions. In Hollingsworth and Windsor,
the Supreme Court turned a deaf ear to these questions, ignoring an amicus brief
from prominent religious liberty scholars (Douglas Laycock, Marc D. Stern, and
Thomas C. Berg) on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.108 The brief urged
the Court, as it moves toward the recognition of same-sex marriage, to ensure not
only the liberty of same-sex couples—which the brief fully supports—but also the
liberty of religious objectors.109 Needless to say, if the Court were to recognize a
right to same-sex marriage by characterizing opponents as animus-driven, that

101. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2689.
104. Id. at 2690.
105. It may be that states deviate from a tradition of horizontal federalism—creating the
potential for a Windsor-like argument—when they refuse to recognize the marriages of
migrating same-sex couples who were lawfully married in another state. See Steve Sanders,
Next on the Agenda for Marriage Equality Litigators . . ., SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013,
5:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/next-on-the-agenda-for-marriage-equalitylitigators/.
106. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
107. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
108. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Committee in Support of the
Individual Respondents on the Merits, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12-144), United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
109. See id.; cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in
Support of Hollingsworth and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (citing religious liberty concerns in urging judicial restraint
in the consideration of same-sex marriage claims); see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson
eds., 2008) (collection of essays highlighting religious liberty issues).
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reasoning would hardly support a sensitive accommodation of these important
competing liberties.110
CONCLUSION
Returning to Justice Scalia’s question about the Fourteenth Amendment’s
meaning over time, I would propose the following response: A constitutional right
to same-sex marriage will emerge, and properly so, when the Supreme Court
determines that justice so requires and when that determination is sufficiently
supported by evolving national values that the Court’s recognition of this right
“will—in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future—gain general
assent.”111 In my judgment, we are fast approaching that juncture.112 The Court
could rely on “animus” reasoning to reach this result, and, if Scalia is correct, it is
likely to do so.113 But that line of analysis was seriously flawed in Windsor, and it
would be especially misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Justices to extend it to
the state-law context. As an alternative rationale, substantive due process would
provide plausible support for a right to same-sex marriage, but only to a limited
degree. By every indication, the strongest, most candid, and most judicious
rationale would rest on equal protection, with the Court concluding that
classifications based on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, triggering heightened
scrutiny that marriage prohibitions cannot survive.

110. Cf. Richard W. Garnett, Worth Worrying About?: Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Freedom, COMMONWEAL (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.common
wealmagazine.org/worth-worrying-about (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Windsor, characterizing DOMA supporters “as backward and bigoted, unworthy of
respect . . . is not likely to generate compromise or accommodation and so . . . poses a
serious challenge to religious freedom”).
111. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 239.
112. Even the opponents of same-sex marriage increasingly believe that its recognition
is inevitable, a position that does not suggest enduring resistance. In Gay Marriage Debate,
Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as ‘Inevitable’, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 6, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/06/in
-gay-marriage-debate-both-supporters-and-opponents-see-legal-recognition-as-inevitable/.
113. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

